1. Why is electronic voting considered "unsafe"?
Most current electronic systems have weaknesses in their ability to
allow for an audit trail. Once the vote is cast, the machine and software
take over. There is no way to check back to see what the voter actually
marked, so voter intent cannot be confirmed.
2. What about the idea of printing a receipt after the voter
is finished? This won't work either. Once the voter enters
his/her vote on the machine, the machine and software can print out
what the voter chose, but can COUNT whatever the programmer wants
it to count. There is a fatal flaw in this system caused by the disconnect
between the actual voter choice and what the machine enters or counts.
These receipts are no greater security than no record at all.
3. How is the FEVER system different? Our system uses
a paper ballot and modern computer technology to speed up the counting
process while maintaining the paper audit trail. The ballot is placed
on the reader in the voting booth and the voter marks his/her choices
using the combination electronic and ink pen. As each choice is made,
the FEVER system logs the choice and adds the vote to the totals.
If the computer system fails, power goes out or questions arise about
the integrity of the count, the election officials simply get out
the paper ballots and count the results using people instead of machines.