If these institutions which are constantly updated with the latest
security safeguards are vulnerable, why wouldn't an election system
be vulnerable? The stakes in an election can be unbelievably high. The
temptation for people who wish to change the outcome of an election
creates a potentially disasterous situation for any democracy. The following
discussion of existing or proposed voting systems is provided as an
information source and reflects the opinions of our staff. This list
is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all possible voting methods
but instead discusses several types of systems and raises questions
regarding potential or real problems with each system.
Paper Ballot Voting Systems
Marking voting choices or writing in choices on a paper ballot is
a voting method used throughout the world. Drawbacks to voting methods
relying solely on paper ballots are the length of time required to
tally votes and the likelihood that human error will occur in the
tallying process. Most manual vote counting processes require that
at least two people view each ballot to confirm the count. Thus, tallying
paper ballots by manual counting is an inefficient method of counting
votes. This method has survived for so long, in part, because paper
ballots are considered the ultimate indication of voter intent.
The viability of paper ballots marked by the voter is clear, but only
when paper ballots are used in combination with an electronic vote
gathering system with instantaneous tallying capabilities does the
use of paper ballots remain practical for modern elections. Some systems
that do require a voter to mark a paper ballot require a secondary
process to read votes into a machine for tallying. This additional
handling and processing of ballots increase both the chance for error
and the possibility of ballot tampering. The counting of paper ballots
should be necessary only in the event of a challenged election, or
as a means for auditing the electronic vote tally results.
Other systems such as punch card ballot systems have usage problems
such as the infamous hanging chad or pregnant chad and have caused
questions to arise as to the voters intent when punching the card.
Direct Recording Electronic
(DRE) Voting Systems
Direct Recording Electronic voting systems typically provide no paper
trail for backup and audit purposes.
U. S. Pat. No. 6,250,548 to McClure, et al., 2001 June 26; U. S. Pat.
Application No. 20010042005 to McClure, et al. 2001 November 15; and,
U. S. Pat. No. 5,377,099 to Miyagawa; 1994 December 27; disclose voting
systems that use only an electronic representation of a ballot. They
do not make available a marked paper ballot to indicate ultimate voter
intent when there is a question about the integrity of an election.
Any system that relies on software and computer processing as the
exclusive method of vote recording provides no method to check results
of the electronic vote gathering against the actual marks or choices
made by a voter. Actual marks are nonexistent. So no paper ballots
are provided for challenged election which compromises audit possibilities.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,649,264 to Carson 1987 March 10, discloses a computer
system requiring a button be pushed to vote that does not mark the
ballot itself, so no record of voter intent is provided.
Some systems such as disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,063,600 to Norwood
1991 November 5, and U. S. Pat. Application No. 20020007457 from C.
Andrew Neff 2002 January 17 do not provide a marked paper ballot and
do not provide an electronic image of a ballot. Lack of a paper trail
because paper ballots are not marked by a voter and lack of an electronic
image removes any possibility of an audit to confirm that electronic
election data match true voter intent. Other systems U. S. Pat. No.
6,194,698 to Zavislan, et al., 2001 February 27, that do require a
voter to mark a paper ballot require a secondary process to read votes
into a machine for tallying. This additional handling and processing
of ballots increases both the chance for error and the possibility
of ballot tampering.
U. S. Pat. No. 6,250,548 to McClure, et al., 2001 June 26, discloses
a complex, electronic system utilizing mechanical devices; a system
requiring complicated setup and takedown and that is difficult to
store. McClure, et al. discloses a system that utilizes a standard
networking technique of daisy-chain of units and a nonvolatile memory,
such as used in various portable electronic devices. If one device
in the chain fails there is a possibility that all devices further
down the daisy chain will fail or at least lose their communication
path to a system computer. A voting system using only an electronic
representation of a ballot, such as disclosed in McClure, et al. 6,250,548
does not make available a marked paper ballot to indicate ultimate
voter intent. McClure et al. further discloses use of a mechanical
switch matrix. Mechanical devices of this type require substantial
system maintenance, and consist of components that require frequent
replacement, particularly in heavily used areas. McClure et al. further
discloses a system with mechanical devices prone to malfunctions that
are difficult to detect during an election. When a particular switch
stops working properly, the vote may not be counted for that choice.
The malfunction appears as an under-vote that is typically accepted
by election officials as the voter choosing not to vote in that race.
It is likely the failure would not be recognized until the next system
test, thus the election data from this device would be inaccurate.
McClure et al. further discloses use of a bar code reader to determine
the style of a ballot on a vote reader. Bar codes can be designed
to conceal information and require additional bar code reading equipment,
adding to the cost of a system. Bar code readers are prone to malfunctions
since they depend on a clean and unwrinkled bar code surface in order
for bar code to be properly read. Using any optical or mechanical
device such as a bar code reader to identify ballot types is unreliable
and costly.
Wise et al., 5,218,528, discloses a computer-based voting system whereby
a voter uses a graphic display to read a ballot and a computer is
required at every voting station. The cost of a complex graphic display
system is high, and voters unaccustomed to using computers may suffer
from computer anxiety or be confused about how to use such a system.
U. S. Pat. No. 6,081,793 to Challener, et al., 2000 June 27, discloses
a system for security of election results and authentication of voter
identification in part via a data processing system which utilizes
a smart card and allows removal of ineligible or challenged votes.
Some of the disadvantages of this disclosure are that a smart card
has potential for abuse in that voter identification data can be stored
on the card without the knowledge of a voter and there is no separation
of voter registration and voting data. Further, special equipment
must be utilized to read a smart card, thus a voter has no way of
checking exactly what is on the card. Systems such as this raise the
possibility that a voting system could potentially link a voter to
the choices made during voting, thus compromising the anonymity of
a voter.
U.S. Pat. No. 5,497,318, to Miyagawa 1996 March 5, discloses an election
terminal apparatus which uses handwriting recognition. U. S. Pat.
No. 5,732,222 to Miyagawa, et al., 1998 March 24, discloses an election
terminal apparatus and an electronic system used for voting and totaling
votes cast in an election that requires an integral-type display and
tablet unit for input data and an optical character recognition capability
for write-in voting. As with any system that utilizes handwriting
recognition, the likelihood of recognition and conversion error is
too great to be acceptable for important data such as write-in votes.
U.S. Pat. No. 5,218,528 to Wise et al., 1993 June 8, discloses a
feature that requires a voter to indicate the desire to enter a write-in
vote. The voter must then be provided a printed write-in ballot for
the particular race for which the write-in vote is to be entered.
A system printer must be operational, and if each voting station is
not equipped with a printer, a voter must wait for the special ballot
to be printed causing confusion and delays in the voting process,
especially when a large numbers of voters wish to cast write-in votes.
Manufacturers of DRE electronic voting systems are trying to address
the outcry for a paper audit trail. Proposals include having the system
print a receipt for the voter when finished voting. This increases
the complexity of the system and requires that the printer remain
functional for the duration of an election. The main problem with
this idea is that unless the voter takes the time to review the completed
receipt and somehow certify that it accurately represents his or her
choices, the audit trail loses integrity. Once the voter is finished
using the system, the machine takes over and provides the receipt.
What safeguard is there to guarantee that the machine produces and
exact record of the voters choices? This is a potential fatal weakness
in these proposed additions to DRE voting.
Optical Scanning Systems
Optical Readers are electronic devices used to tally, or to collect
and tally, paper ballot votes. U. S. Pat. No. 6,194,698 to Zavislan,
et al., 2001 February 27, and U. S. Pat. No. 5,635,726 to Zavislan,
et al., 1997 June 3, disclose electro-optical sensor circuitry suitable
for use as an optical detection system for electronic voting apparatus.
Pat. No. 6,194,698 discloses a sensor circuit with an array of a plurality
of optical signal responsive photodetectors; an amplifier stage, which
is a transimpedance stage; and a feedback circuit. The system uses
polarized light transmitted from sources of illumination, such as
Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs), and is received at the photodetectors
via cross-polarizers. Such systems, which require a voter to use an
ink pen for checking boxes, connecting lines, or other techniques,
can result in questioned or uncounted ballots due to improper marking.
With all optical systems, smudges or dirt on a ballot corrupts the
scanning process creating a high possibility for error. The quality
of the ink mark is important. An optical reader may miss light or
inconsistent marks made by a voter. Optical readers are cumbersome
to transport to election sites and to store between elections and
are sensitive to dirt and dust accumulation on the optical areas.
Also, completed paper ballots must go through a secondary process
of being fed through the scanning apparatus, requiring extra time
and handling to process the ballots.
Internet Voting
A recent voting method is via the Internet. Millions of voters do
not have access to the Internet. Internet voting is mistrusted by
many voters because of issues with voter identification, multiple
voting, possible outside influences in vote tallying, and other problems.
Serious security and privacy risks must be addressed and solved before
the Internet can become a viable voting method. The use of a paper
ballot in combination with the Internet is not possible, so no paper
ballot is available as a backup audit trail for election officials
if ever needed.
Systems utilizing encryption codes have been proposed and developed.
Sophisticated computer hackers breaking encryption codes would cause
results to be questioned. Even if a hacker could not break the encryption
code itself, merely gaining access to the system would result in doubt
regarding the security of the voting process. Computer hackers have
the ability to enter any Internet portal, and election information
is tempting to hackers due to the high profile of elections. Lack
of a paper trail, when paper ballots are not marked by a voter, removes
any possibility of an audit to confirm that electronic election data
match true voter intent when voting occurs over the Internet.